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RECENT CASES
velopment. The degree of state involvement into the affairs of
the housing project has transformed its representatives into in-
struments or agents of the state. Eviction of tenants from such
a housing project is a very serious injury and "dangerous weap-
on"8' 2 thereby necessitating the requisite due process guarantee
of an administrative hearing. Such a hearing is applicable to all
the tenants living in a limited-profit housing development. "It is
not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might term-
inate a lease at his pleasure. 's3 Here we are dealing with gov-
ernmental actions that are "'circumscribed by the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment.' ,,s4
SAMMY FELDMAN
PRISONER RIGHTS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION, DUE PROC-
ESS, INDEFINITE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, CENSORSHIP OF MAIL, IN-
MATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DAMAGES
On June 25, 1968, Martin Sostre was placed in solitary con-
finement at New York State's Green Haven Prison for alleged
violations of prison rules.' One year and eight days later, a
United States district court ordered his release pendente lite.
Subsequently, that court decided that Sostre had not been pun-
82. Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesir-
ables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988, 991 (1968).
83. Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 344, 288 N.Y.S.2d
159, 166 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970).
84. Id., citing Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
1. Sostre had allegedly violated several prison rules by failing to obey all orders
"promptly and fully," failing to answer all questions "fully and truthfully," corresponding
about restricted matters, and possessing contraband. The contraband consisted of two
small pieces of emery paper (a possible escape tool, according to the warden), six tables
of contents torn from issues of the Harvard Law Review and bearing a stamp identifying
these issues as belonging to Sostre (indicating that Sostre was lending his books to other
prisoners without first receiving the warden's permission in violation of a prison rule),
and a letter which Sostre was admittedly in the process of translating into English for
another prisoner.
2. The day after his court-ordered release, Sostre was punished for "having dust
on his cell bars." He was confined to his cell for several days and consequently missed
the annual 4th of July celebration, the only occasion during the year when all the
prisoners were allowed to congregate together. A month after this punishment, he was
deprived of certain privileges because of "inflammatory, racist literature" found in his
cell. The literature consisted of both magazine and newspaper articles which Sostre had
extracted from permitted magazines and personal writings. Topics included quotations
from Mao Tse Tung, rules of conduct of the Black Panther Party, and an original
article entitled "Revolutionary Thoughts."
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ished for the alleged violations but for his threat to sue the war-
den for withholding certain mail, his history of litigation, and
his black militancyY After reviewing the many issues raised, the
lower court: (1) held that solitary confinement for longer than
fifteen days violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment; (2) ordered defendant-prison officials to
submit rules and regulations governing all future disciplinary pro-
ceedings where solitary confinement or loss of good time credit
is a possible result;4 (3) forbade the censoring of mail to or from
any court, public official, lawyer, or codefendant;' (4) forbade
punishment for sharing legal materials or assisting other prison-
ers in legal matters unless a court-approved alternative was pro-
vided; (5) forbade punishment of Sostre for possessing politi-
cal literature or expressing political beliefs without court-ap-
proved rules; 6 (6) ordered defendants to credit Sostre with 124 1/3
days good time credit which he could have earned if not in soli-
tary confinement; and (7) awarded Sostre compensatory and pu-
nitive damages totalling over $13,000.00. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, with four judges dissent-
ing at least in part, reversed almost all of the lower court's rul-
ings.7 Held: (1) Sostre was improperly placed in solitary con-
finement; (2) the warden was liable for compensatory, but not
punitive damages;" (3) prison officials do not have to submit rules
and regulations for judicial approval; (4) prison authorities may
read all correspondence, but may not ordinarily tamper with
such; (5) a prisoner cannot be punished for mere possession of
literature; and (6) Sostre should be credited with 124 1/3 days
of good time. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Sostre's threat to sue the
warden was not an idle one. He has been involved in considerable litigation while im-
prisoned, much of it successful. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1964) ;
Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
4. The lower court held that before Sostre could be so punished again he must be
given written notice of the charges against him, a hearing before an impartial official
where he could call and cross-examine witnesses, a written record of the proceeding with
reasons for the decision, as well as the right to retain counsel or a counsel substitute.
5. The court also protected the translation of letters for other prisoners.
6. Defendants were ordered to submit rules and regulations governing the receipt,
distribution, discussion, and writing of political literature.
7. The Court of Appeals also dismissed as defendants the State Commissioner of
Correction and the warden of another prison in which Sostre had spent one night.
8. At the time of the judgment the warden had died, and the court held that the
award was, uncollectible. It did leave the door open for an action against the warden's
estate, however.
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Historically, the judiciary has been extremely reluctant to
intervene in prison affairsY At one time, the courts went so far
as to consider the prisoner a mere "slave of the state," subject
to its every discretionary whim. 0 However, there are indications
that this "hands-off doctrine" may be losing a great deal of its
vitality." The case of Coffin v. Reiohardl was exemplary of this
enlightened judicial attitude. In this case, the court provided a
much more rational and equitable standard from which to re-
view alleged infringements of a prisoner's rights: "A prisoner
retains all the rights, of an ordinary citizen except those expressly,
or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."'13 When
applying this standard, however, the court was still left with the
problem of balancing the right of freedom against administrative
discretion and the scope of judicial review.14 When the right in-
volved is a preferred one, such as freedom of expression, or free-
dom of religion, the traditional defense of the prison officials,
that the infringement was necessary to maintain prison order,
carries little weight.' 5
Freedom of expression grounded in the traditionally sensi-
tive first amendment has always been a right which enjoyed pre-
ferred judicial status. Therefore, courts have not been reluctant
to interfere with the discretion of prison authorities concerning
written communication, particularly communication with the
courts.' 6 While the practice of censoring prisoners' mail has been
well established,' 7 the court in Ex parte Hull'8 forbade prison au-
9. See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See also Hirschkop & Mille-
mann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969). According to
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954): "courts
are without power to supervise . . .prison rules or regulations."
10. Ruflin v. Virginia, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
11. See J. CAMIPBELL, J. SAHID, & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAw ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 639 (1970). The term "hands-off doctrine" was ap-
parently first used in Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961) (document
prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
12. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
13. Id. at 445.
14. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights,
23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 508 (1971).
15. Id.
16. Comment, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985, 987 (1962).
17. Note, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 397, 413 (1965).
18. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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thorities from interfering with a prisoner applying to a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. According to the Hull Court,
prison authorities were usurping a judicial, function when they
took it upon themselves to pass on the merits of such communi-
cations.' 9 In 1970 a United States district court intervened when a
prisoner's mail, critical of prison administration, was censored,
stating:
Any prison regulation or practice which restricts the right
of free expression that a prisoner would have enjoyed if he had
not been imprisoned must be related both reasonably . . .and
necessarily ... to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of
imprisonment.2 0
In a case decided a month later, another district court forbade
the opening or inspecting of incoming or outgoing mail between
prisoners and attorneys and certain specified officials.2 1 The court,
however, acknowledged that prison authorities should have the
power to examine all other types of incoming letters.2
Correspondence with courts through the mail is viewed on a
higher level of freedom of expression than communication with
fellow inmates.2 3 Except for cases involving racial or reli-
gious material, there have been few relevant or definitive deci-
sions, 24 but a United States court of appeals has noted that "a
propagandist has no judicially enforceable right to propagandize
within the prison walls, whether his propaganda be directed to
other inmates or to outsiders."'2- The explosiveness of a prison
setting is difficult to ignore, and courts generally refrain from in-
19. Id. at 549.
20. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
21. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970). "[T]otal censorship
serves no rational deterrent, rehabilitative or prison security purposes."
22. The court reasoned that there exists the possibility of LSD stains, drugs, weapons,
etc. being secreted in the correspondence. The court also ordered that if confiscation is
the result, the prisoner must be notified and given full particulars as to the confiscation.
23. See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See also Hirschkop & Mille.
mann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); Leopold, What
is Wrong with the Prison System?, 45 NEB. L. Rav. 33 (1966); Comment, The Right of
Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967).
24. See Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners'
Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. Ray. 473, 485, 488 (1971).
25. McCloskey v. State of Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964). This decision
involved a prisoner punished for anti-semetic expressions. See also Roberts v. Pepersack,
256 F. Supp. 415, 429 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967) (no right to openly
defy authority).
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terfering with prison officials' discretion in forbidding certain
types of expression whether political, racial, or otherwise. 26
The prisoner's rights to access to legal materials and to as-
sist fellow prisoners in legal matters are closely related to his
freedom of expression. Implied within the right to communi-
cate with a court is the right to make an informed and
educated communication. Formerly, the judicial attitude was that
access to legal materials was a privilege rather than a right,2 7 but
as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision, Younger v.
Gilmore,28 which held that a state must provide its prisoners with
adequate law libraries, this attitude has lost its validity. In the
area of inmate legal assistance, the advantages and disadvantges
have been contested,2 and it took the United States Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Avery30 to resolve the dispute. Johnson had
been punished for assisting another prisoner in preparing a writ.
The Court forbade prohibition of such activities unless a "reason-
able alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions
for post-conviction relief" was provided by the state.31 The state
retained the power to impose "reasonable restrictions and re-
straints" until such a reasonable alternative was provided. 2
While courts have been somewhat sensitive to possible in-
fringements of the prisoner's first amendment rights, it appears
that they have been less able to define and protect the prisoner's
eighth amendment right against "cruel and unusual punish-
ment." The great majority of cases involving cruel and unusual
punishment determinations, unlike the instant case, have dealt
26. But see Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Shakur v. McGrath, 303
F. Supp. 299 ($.D.N.Y. 1969).
27. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Henson v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Matter of Chessman v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
28. 92 S. Ct. 250 (1971).
29. A defense of the prison official's point of view can be found in Spector, A Prison
Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALnF. L. REv. 365 (1968). The author, a prison
librarian at San Quentin, favors strict controls over "jailhouse lawyers" because friction
among inmates is increased when payment for legal services is not forthcoming and
spurious claims are common. The main justifications for the existence of "jailhouse
lawyers" (lack of other expert assistance and the near impossibility of self-help) are con-
tained in Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. RaV. 371 (1968).
30. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
31. Id. at 490.
32. Id. Examples of permissible restrictions are limitations as to time and place for
the rendering of such assistance and the imposition of punishment for giving or receiving
compensation for rendering such assistance.
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with physical brutality,3 although recent cases indicate that some
courts will give credence to arguments that non-physical punish-
ment can also be cruel and unusual. Jackson v. Bishop, 4 for in-
stance, condemned the use of a whip for punishment, not only
because of the physical brutality involved, but also because of the
fact that such punishment contained little rehabilitative value,,
Earlier, a federal court had intervened when the physical condi-
tions "could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and under-
mine the sanity of the prisoner."' 0 Recently, Arkansas's entire pris-
on system was held unconstitutional because the conditions in
which the prisoners were forced to live constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment.37 Courts as a general rule, however, are still
reluctant to intervene unless the circumstances involve clearly
outrageous conduct.3 8
Recent decisions have also evidenced a trend towards de-
manding procedural due process for prisoners,28 but like other
aspects of corrections litigation, the law in this area is still far
from clear. Even in those decisions expressly calling for proce-
dural due process safeguards, there generally have been no real
definitive guidelines set down for prison officials to follow.40 An
exception to this general rule is found in Morris v. Travisono4t
33. Comment, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 58 U. Citi.
L. REV. 647, 656 (1971). But see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). (Non-physical
punishment can be cruel and unusual because it violates "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."); 'Wecms v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910).
34. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
55. Id. at 579-80.
36. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). Another court actually released
prisoners because of the conditions under which they were forced to live. Curley v.
Gonzales, Civil Nos. 8372, 8373 (D.N.M., Feb. 13, 1970).
38. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights,
23 STAN. L. Rav. 475,492 (1971).
59. See Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights,
53 IowA L. REv. 671 (1967). Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), however, is still the
normal starting point for judicial decisions in this area. "Lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. at 285.
40. Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 175,
292 (1970). But see Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (rudi-
mentary due process safeguards mandated).
41. 510 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970). These regulations were the result of proposals
submitted by both sides. The judge also retained jurisdiction for eighteen months to
ensure compliance with these regulations and to be able to make any necessary changes.
This decision has been hailed with thinly disguised approval in Wright v. McMann, 321
F. Supp. 127, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). In fact, the judge in the Wright case called for rules
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where the court laid down exact regulations for prison authori-
ties to follow in future disciplinary proceedings. Although an
unusual decision, it is indicative of the fact that courts generally
are becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of assuring pro-
cedural due process guarantees to prisoners.
Before attempting to resolve the main issues raised in the
instant case, the court dealt with Sostre's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. In an almost peremptory manner, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court
that as a precondition for maintaining a suit in a federal court
there was no need for Sostre to pursue: (1) all his state adminis-
trative remedies because such action would be futile; and (2)
all his state judicial remedies because a section 1983 civil rights
action is "supplementary" to any remedy offered by the state.43
The court also noted that Sostre's section 1983 action was sincere,
not merely a su1~terfuge to avoid the exhaustion of state remedies
requirement of an habeas corpus action.44
Having disposed of this threshold issue the court in the in-
stant case went on to reject most of the lower court's other rul-
ings. It held that a prisoner may not be punished merely for his
beliefs or expression of beliefs,45 and that Sostre should not have
been punished merely for possessing "inflammatory, racist liter-
ature. '46 However, it held that a warden could confiscate such
literature if he believed that there was a risk of circulation among
other inmates which threatened prison security.47 The court rea-
soned that to allow punishment to be levied for mere expression
of a belief, political or otherwise, would create a dangerous op-
portunity for discriminatory punishment by the authorities. 48 It
and regulations to be submitted to him by the prison officials involved, thereby following
the lead of Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Nolan v.
Scafati, 806 F. Supp. 15 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) in which the
lower court judge assumed certain due process safeguards to be necessary.
42. See Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. Ricrrs-Civ. Lim.
L. REv. 227, 248 (1970).
43. 442 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as instant case]. Sostre
was proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
44. Instant case at 182.
45. Id. at 202.
46. Id. The court took into account the fact that Sostre had received no prioi




hinted strongly that the warden may punish if "reasonable regu-
lations" governing such expression are violated.40
In holding that prison officials cannot prohibit inmate legal
assistance, the court relied upon Johnson v. Avery and reiterated
the Supreme Court's holding that, although reasonable regula-
tions governing such assistance can be promulgated, an adequate
substitute is necessary before such assistance can be prohibited 0
Sostre's punishment would normally be permitted, however, be-
cause he had failed to abide by such reasonable rulesY' Sim-
ilarly, the court upheld the prison rule against sharing of law
materials because it was not shown to be unreasonable.62
The court held that correspondence between a prisoner and
his attorney, any court or public official cannot be tampered with
unless the prisoner has clearly abused this right.13 It noted that
as long as the prisoner has the proper intent none of his corres-
pondence can be censored.5 4 The court did not delineate how
such proper intent is to be determined, but it did clearly state
that a prison official cannot substitute his judgment for that of
the prisoner merely because he believes the prisoner's allegations
to be repetitious, false or malicious.5 5 "The generous scope of dis-
cretion accorded prison authorities also heightens the importance
of permitting free and uninhibited access by prisoners to both
administrative and judicial forums for the purpose of seeking re-
dress of grievances against state officers."50 The court, despite this
language, upheld the prohibition of mail to Sostre's codefendant,
because here they also considered the warden's conduct reason-
able.57
Concerning procedural due process safeguards, the court re-
versed the lower court's order requiring the defendant-prison
officials to submit rules and regulations governing future disci-
plinary proceedings because there was no proof that New York
49. Id. at 204. "We do not hereby enjoin officials from taking reasonable measures
to prevent prisoners from inciting disturbances and othenvise to protect the security and
order of New York prisons, consistent with prisoners' rights to freedom of expression." Id.
50. Id. at 201.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id. at 200.
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 200.
57. Id. at 201.
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State's prison system "regularly and systematically" ignored due
process requirements.58 The court concluded that Sostre's due pro-
cess protections did not have to be as extensive as those found
in a trial-type hearing,59 and, noting its lack of expertise, stated
that it would not interfere with the state officials who are en-
trusted with the task of rehabilitating the prisoners.60 Since the
uniqueness of each prisoner's case discourages formalized fules
and regulations, the trial-type safeguards set up by the lower court
are not necessary in every such disciplinary proceeding.61 Cau-
tioning prison officials to refrain from arbitrary or capricious
conduct, the court outlined what it considered to be minimal pro-
cedural due process safeguards, but hinted that even these are
not essential in eveiy proceeding involving substantial discipline.
6 2
As for Sostre's segregation, the court agreed that it was im-
proper from the beginning. While noting that Sostre had com-
mited offenses serious enough to merit solitary confinement, the
court agreed with the lower court that in actuality Sostre's con-
finement was based upon Warden Follette's personal fear of be-
ing sued, Sostre's past legal activism and his black militancy. The
court's decision, therefore, was based on the warden's improper
motives, not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment. The court also was careful to point out that
similar punishment for lesser offenses might be considered uncon-
stitutional.6 3 The court also found that Sostre's'punishment was
less severe than it appeared from the district court's opinion. 4
58. Id. at 203.
59. "Follette's relation to Sostre should not be viewed as adversarial in the same
sense that a criminal trial is adversarial." Id. at 196. The court cites Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403 (1970) (parole release determination does not require due process guarantees
comparable to those found in trial).
60. Instant case at 196-97.
61. Id. at 203.
62. Id. "We would not lightly condone the absence of such basic safeguards against
arbitrariness as adequate notice, an opportunity for the prisoner to reply to charges
lodged against him, and a reasonable investigation into the relevant facts-at least in cases
of substantial discipline." Id.
63. Id. at 194 n.28. "We stress the seriousness of the multiple offenses charged against
Sostre . . . and express no view as to the constitutionality of such segregated confinement
as Sostre experienced if it were imposed for lesser offenses." Id.
64. The court noted that Sostre had the opportunity for an hour of exercise each
day, an opportunity to participate in "group therapy," at least a limited access to the
prison library and complete access to law materials, and the existence of at least minimal
hygienic conditions. The court also found that Sostre was not completely isolated from the
other prisoners. The possibility always existed for some form of communication. Id. at
193-94.
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It refused to find that indefinite solitary confinement or solitary
confinement for longer than fifteen days was cruel and unusual
punishment.6 Reasoning that "[f]or a federal court . . . to place
a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an in-
mate is a drastic interference with the state's political and admin-
istrative processes."0 6 The court felt it lacked expertise in such
matters. Even with the benefit of "a lifetime of study" it would
not be within a federal court's domain to interfere with the policy
of a state because the court personally found it unsound or re-
pugnant.(7 Sostre's punishment did not so measure up to stan-
dards such as "barbarous," "shocking to the conscience," or "so
foul, so inhuman, and so violative of basic concepts of decency"
as to justify limiting such punishment in the future or establishing
that Sostre's own punishment was unconstitutional."8
There were four judges who dissented at least in part with
the majority opinion. Two of these would have denied any relief
to the prisoner because he was not entitled to the rights of a
free person nor were his alleged deprivations of rights sufficiently
shocking as to justify interfering with the internal affairs of a
state prison."' Judge Feinberg would allow solitary confinement
for a "sharply limited period" of time and even then only for a
"serious breach of prison discipline."70 In his view the lower
court's finding, as trier of fact, that cruel and unusual punish-
ment existed should have been respected. 71 He felt there was
enough expert evidence to justify classifying Sostre's punishment
as "cruel and unusual.172 Judge Smith agreed with Judge Fein-
berg that solitary confinement for longer than a year constitutes
65. Id. at 192.
66. Id. at 191.
67. Id. Yet, the court sanctioned the relevancy of opinions of experts, citing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth amendment invokes the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society').
68. Instant case at 191-92.
69. Id. at 209-10 (Hays & Moore, JJ., dissenting).
70. Id. at 209.
71. Id. at 207-08. The majority opinion cites Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (reviewing court may overturn finding if on the entire
evidence it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made) as
justification for not abiding by the lower court's findings of fact.
72. Instant case at 209. The majority opinion answers Judge Feinberg's criticism by
countering that Sostre had not been shown to have been adversely affected by the con-
finement. The court also argues that the experts are not in agreement that such conditions
are dangerous to a prisoner's sanity. It is not the court's function, in the absence of
complete expert agreement, to interfere with what is essentially a state decision. Id. at
193-94.
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cruel and unusual punishment and also felt that recovery against
the Commissioner of Correction should have been upheld.
In New York State, the Commissioner of Correction, an ap-
pointee of the Governor, has been delegated complete supervisory
control over the state prison system by the legislature. 73 Subject
to relevant statutory law, the Commissioner is, among other
things, responsible for promulgating rules and regulations gov-
erning these prisons, appointing and removing employees, and
investigating any charge of improper conduct on the part of any
prison official.74 Because his office is the creation of the legislature
and he is appointed by the Governor, the Commissioner of Cor-
rection is, in effect, the spokesman for both the legislature and
the Governor. The only checks on his discretion are statutes en-
acted by the legislature and decisions rendered by the judiciary.
If the legislature does not enact statutes sharply defining the
power of its Commissioner, or if the federal courts refuse to in-
tervene when federal constitutional rights are infringed, the com-
plete discretionary authority left in the hands of the Commission-
er and subordinate prison officials may often be abused."5 Yet, the
court in the instant case is extremely reluctant to interfere with
prison management because it is essentially a legislative or ad-
ministrative matter.76 "[T]he proper tools for the job [reform] do
not lie with a remote federal court. 7 7 Yet, in other equally spe-
cialized areas, the courts have intervened when the logical pro-
tectors of basic human rights have abdicated their responsibility.
Decisions such as Baker v. Carr,78 Brown v. Board of Education,79
Miranda v. Arizona,0 and countless others were responses by the
courts to inaction on the part of another branch of government.
There can be little doubt that prison reforms should be im-
plemented by the legislature or correctional officials themselves,
73. N.Y. CoRREc. LAv § 5 (McKinney 1970).
74. Id. § 112.
75. State courts, the logical guardians of state prisoners' rights are generally less
willing to remedy existing conditions. See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 40, at 317.
76. "It is a judgment among competing, rational policies, a judgment therefore
properly reserved for decision by state political and administrative processes." Instant case
at 193-94 n.24. "[A] judgment entrusted to state officials, not federal judges." Id. at 197.
77. Id. at 205.
78. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (courts may scrutinize fairness of legislative apportionments).
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing state's "separate but equal" public education).
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protection of right to silence of person undergoing cus-
todial interrogation).
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but when these groups refuse to do so, the courts must step in
to fill the breach."- "[T]he fact remains that, traditionally, our
society has entrusted ultimate responsibility for preservation of
constitutional values to the judicial system, with the legislature
and administrators in important but subordinate roles. ' 2 Article
III, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides in part,
"[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this constitution . . . ." This clause and the prece-
dent of judicial intervention exemplified by decisions such as
Baker v. Carr indicate that the courts have not only the right, but
also the duty to intervene when basic human rights are being in-
fringed upon with the tacit approval (through inaction) of the
legislature.
Not only prisoners, but prison officials themselves, are vic-
tims of such refusals to act responsibly in this area. A prison's
problems are a microcosm of society's problems and thus far so-
ciety has denied prison officials the effective tools to combat them.
It is understandable that prison officials, underpaid, understaffed,
and faced with overcrowded prisons and rebellious inmates, are
almost exclusively concerned with maintaining security, even if
constitutional rights are infringed upon in the process.8 3 One of
the underlying reasons for Sostre's imprisonment, for instance,
was the warden's fear of rebellion by the prison population. 4 Yet,
the court cannot allow itself to acquiesce in unreasonable depri-
vations of constitutional rights.
The consequence of the court's struggle in the instant case
to balance the need for security with basic rights of prisoners is
that the opinion is confusing and disappointing to prisoner and
jailor alike. For example, although the court outlines certain min-
imal due process safeguards, it does so in the manner of sugges-
tion, not command. Both prisoner and prison official are left with
81. "The true measure of the quality of a judicial system is how many hidden
problems it brings into public view and how well it stimulates the responsible agencies
into doing something about it." Bazelon, A Probing Role for the Courts, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1971, at 27 col. 3.
82. Kimball & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat and
Response, 14 CamSE & DEL.n. 1, 6 (1968).
83. See, e.g., Clines, Resentment Rife in Attica Homes, N.Y. Times Sept. 12, 1971, at
73, col. 1; Gaddis, What Went Wrong at San Quentin?, N.Y. Times Sept. 9, 1971, at 41,
col. 3.
84. Instant case at 183.
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unclear, imprecise standards for guidance s5 On another issue, the
court refused to rule that Sostre's indefinite solitary confinement
was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment because the
quality of Sostre's confinement was "several notches above those
truly barbarous and inhumane conditions heretofore condemned
.. . as 'cruel and unusual.' "I'l Yet, in a footnote, the court hints
that such punishment would be cruel and unusual if imposed
for "lesser offenses.11 7 Again, how are prisoners and prison officials
to interpret these cryptic statements when applying them in future
situations? It is apparent that the court has created more questions
than it has answered.
The most obvious example of the court's attempt to balance
the rights of the prisoner against the prison officials' need for se-
curity is found in the court's treatment of Sostre's punishment
for possession of literature. While a prisoner can no longer be
punished merely for possession of literature, the literature can be
confiscated if a "risk of circulation" exists which threatens prison
security. 8 Although a "clear and present danger test" will be used
in reviewing a confiscation, "reasonable" measures can be taken by
the authorities to "prevent prisoners from inciting disturbances
and otherwise to protect the security and order of New York
prisons, consistent with prisoners' rights to freedom of expres-
sion."""
The all-important and basic area of correspondence is left
equally as confusing. Correspondence to or from attorneys,
courts, or public officials can still be read by prison officials, but
no deletions can be made unless the right has been "abused" or
"restricted matters" are being communicated.90 Since prison
officials are left to decide what constitutes such "abuse," it is
85. Several recent district courts have promulgated rules governing the disciplinary
process. E.g., Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (24 hours written notice,
opportunity to be heard, presence at hearing); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md.
1971) (several due process safeguards agreed to by both parties) ; Clutchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (rejection of the instant case).
86. Instant case at 194 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 194 n.28 (emphasis added).
88. Sostre v. Otis, 380 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) has since laid down due process
requirements for censorship of reading matter (notice, opportunity to object, fair decision-
making body).
89. Instant case at 204.
90. Instant case at 200.
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foreseeable that unfair discrimination will result." Nor is it
difficult to imagine the apprehension of reprisal a prisoner feels
knowing-that any charge he makes against a prison official will
be read by a prison official. The tactical advantage which this
situation gives the authorities when there is a lawsuit pending
against them is apparent. Even before they appear in court, the
prison authorities have a good idea of what the prisoner's line
of attack will be because their opportunity to censor the mail
gives them an opportunity to examine his evidence from the very
beginning. In addition, if the prisoner should make any statement
at his trial at variance with what he has written in his letters,
such correspondence could conceivably be used against him.0'
Equally apparent is the chilling effect such scrutiny of legal mail
will have on the expression of both the prisoner and his attorney.
What competent legal tactician will knowingly disclose his trial
strategy to his adversary? Consequently, planning for trial strat-
egy will suffer or else a costly and time-consuming trip to confer
privately with the prisoner at the institution must be made to as-
sure confidentiality. There can be no reasonable justification
for reading outgoing mail when one considers the possible damage
to an inmate's state of mind and to our system of justice when
just grievances are not reported because of the fear of reprisal
through loss of good time allowances, solitary confinement, de-
nial of parole, or loss of privileges. It is also difficult to justify
censoring incoming mail from courts, public officials and attor-
neys because these are not the type of people who ordinarily en-
gage in illicit schemes with prisoners. Perhaps mere handling or
use of an instrument such as the fluoroscope would be sufficient
to warn prison authorities of any contraband. Relaxing of such
unreasonable censorship practices will also benefit prison authori-
ties because manpower formerly expended in reading all mail
could be shifted into more useful and needed positions.
It is also regrettable that the court in the instant case did
not allow punitive damages, however small, for this would serve
91. Federal district courts in other circuits have recently promulgated various rules
regarding inspection of attorney-client mail. See Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. - (D. Me.
1971) (opening of mail in search of contraband must occur in presence of inmate);
Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971) (inspection by fluoroscope and manual
manipulation of letter only).
92. See generally Comment, Prisoners' Rights: The Evidentiary Use of Prisoner Mail,
1971 WAsH. U.L.Q. 109.
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notice that arbitrary and capricious action on the part of those
in authority will be strongly condemned by our courts. Further-
more, as a result of the failure to award punitive damages, some
lawyers may be dissuaded from representing prisoner-clients be-
cause the economic feasibility of such action is slight.
The court's rulings concerning federal jurisdiction and ex-
haustion of remedies would not be extraordinary but for the fact
that this circuit has been spearheading an attempt to force civil
rights litigants to pursue state remedies.9 3 The Second Circuit's
paradoxical action in the instant case may signify that it has
abandoned its attempt to keep civil rights litigants out of federal
court, although this is not clear.94
To a certain extent the court is justified in wanting to leave
control over the prison system in the hands of prison authorities,
but there is a crucial difference between control over normal ad-
ministrative details and control over a person's basic constitution-
al rights which our Constitution charges the courts to uphold.95
If it is a preferred right like freedom of religion, freedom of
access to the courts, freedom from censorship, or freedom from
racial discrimination, the burden of proof rests with the prison
administration to show that any restriction is based on a com-
pelling state interest that cannot be served by less restrictive
means.
96
Although correct in believing that prison reform should come
from within the prison system itself, the court is wrong in refus-
ing to heed the lesson of court decisions in other areas of the law
that reform often follows only after stern judicial action.97 This
93. Schwartz, Prisoners' Rights and the Courts, 165 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1971).
94. For a fuller treatment of this perplexing question of exhaustion in the Second
Circuit, see Schwartz supra note 93, at 4.
95. "There is no doubt that discipline.and administration of state detention facilities
are state functions. They are subject to federal authority where paramount federal consti-
tutional or statutory rights supervene." Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969).
96. Turner, supra note 14, at 508, citing Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir.
1969); cf. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr.
504 (1970).
97. "Legislatures traditionally have shown little readiness to provide the authority or
the funds for basic institutional changes. This continued inaction will require courts to
assume the responsibility of ordering changes of conditions .... ." Goldfarb & Singer,
supra note 40, at 191. Perhaps what little irritation the court in the instant case showed
towards the prison authorities had some effect. Shortly after its decision New York State
voluntarily eased its censorship practices of inmates' correspondence. See 1 PRusONERS'
Ricsrrs NawsLrrr.R 15 (1971).
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again is a manifestation of the "hands-off doctrine" with the court
granting what is perhaps undue deference to the "expertise" of
the prison authorities even in areas where constitutional rights
could be involved. The very fact that the court heard the argu-
ments in the instant case en banc shows that it considered the
issues raised to be of the highest importance. Yet, when the op-
portunity arose to resolve these admittedly important issues de-
cisively and authoritatively, the court refused to do so. It is diffi-
cult to justify the action of a court which decries "the deplorable
and counter-productive conditions of many of this country's jails
and prisons, '"' g but is unwilling to do anything about them. It
is not surprising, therefore, that one writer should characterize
this decision as a "ringing affirmation of impotence."""
The opinion as a whole is disappointing mainly because it
demonstrates that courts are still willing to retain the "hands-off
doctrine" in the area of prison reform. While recognizing the
need for such reform, the court clings tenaciously to the hope,
unfulfilled in the years following earlier court condemnations
of prison conditions, that either the legislature or prison officials
will bring such reform about themselves and justifies noninter-
vention by citing the court's lack of expertise. Yet, the court is
not dealing with highly technical issues best left to the judgment
of a competent agency; it is dealing with basic constitutional
rights as important as those dealt with in Baker v. Carr and
Brown v. Board of Education. In those decisions the courts real-
ized that desperately needed reforms might never occur without
strong action on their part. It seems equally, if not more, im-
portant that our courts vigorously safeguard basic constitutional
rights behind the walls of a prison. "[O]ut of sight and out of
mind," '100 the average prisoner's only hope for redress is through
the courts.101 By refusing to strongly intervene the court has
98. Instant case at 205.
99. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 4.
100. Bettman, Until Discharged by Law, 17 CRIME & DELIN. 271, 277 (1971).
101. "Prisoners, having real or imagined grievances, cannot demonstrate in protest
against them. The right peaceably to assemble is denied to them. The only avenue open
to prisoners is taking their case to court." Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56
CALIF. L. Rxv. 343, 347 (1968).
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abdicated its duty to act as the balancing factor on the other
branches of government. If the legislature will not police itself
and the courts will not intervene, persons inside our prisons will
continue to be "out of sight and out of mind" and subject to the
caprices of their jailors.
ROBERT E. WHITE
PROPERTY-SALE OF STOCK AND PROPRIETARY LEASE IN Co-
OPERATIVE APARTMENT HELD AS SALE OF PERSONALTY
Plaintiff Silverman had deposited $15,400 with defendant
Alcoa Plaza Associates1 as down payment for the purchase of shares
of stock and a proprietary lease in a cooperative apartment. The
total purchase price was to be $154,000. Silverman defaulted and
Alcoa retained the deposit as damages. Alcoa subsequently sold
the stock and lease to a third party for the same price. Upon learn-
ing of this transaction, Silverman instituted suit for recovery of the
deposit, seeking to limit Alcoa to its actual damages. On motion
for summary judgment, Alcoa contended that Silverman had
wilfully breached a contract involving the sale of real estate, and
thus Alcoa was entitled to retain the deposit. The supreme court
at special term2 granted Alcoa's motion, holding that the stock
could not be characterized as "goods" under article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,3 but rather that the sale involved real
property with damages awardable accordingly. The appellate divi-
sion reversed, granting Silverman's cross motion for summary
judgment, and remanded for a hearing regarding damages. Held,
shares of cooperative stock relative to a proprietary lease are
"goods" within article 2 of the U.C.C.; as such, the rights of the
parties regarding the deposit should be determined in accordance
1. Hereinafter referred to as Alcoa.
2. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 167, 323 N.Y.S..2d 39,
40 (Ist Dep't 1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
3. N.Y. U.C.C., art. 2, § 2-105 (1) (McKinney 1964) provides that:
'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in
action.
